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I. Introduction
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force on 1 January 
1994, is an agreement between Mexico, Canada and the United States to ensure that covered 
goods and services fall under a comprehensive free trade agreement among the three 
countries. NAFTA included, in Chapter 10, provisions opening up many aspects of the 
parties’ procurement markets.1 As a practical matter, however, NAFTA’s procurement-related 
provisions have largely been overshadowed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA),2 which includes the United States, Canada, 
and many other member parties, but not Mexico. Perhaps in part because Canada has a long 
history of integration with the U.S. industrial base for defense production,3 with regard to 
* Lynn David Research Professor in Government Procurement Law, Co-Director of the Government
Procurement Law Program, George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C.
1 For a thorough discussion of the United States’ implementation of NAFTA in the federal procurement 
system see L. EYESTER, NAFTA and the Barriers to Federal Procurement Opportunities in the United States, 31 
Pub. Cont. L. J. 695 (2002). 
2 See generally S. ARROWSMITH/R. ANDERSON (eds.), The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: 
Challenge and Reform (2011).  The newly revised GPA came into force on April 6, 2014.  See
http://www.wto.org/gpa. 
3 See, e.g., Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement  225.870-1, 48 Code of Federal 
Regulations § 225.870-1  (“[f]or production planning purposes, Canada is part of the [U.S.] defense industrial 
base”), available at http://farsite.hill.af.mil. 
2public procurement the United States’ trading relationship with Canada under the GPA has 
played a more prominent role.4
The importance of the GPA in framing future procurement agreements is being borne out in 
current negotiations, between the European Union and the United States, on a comprehensive 
free trade agreement, known as the Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (T-TIP). 
European negotiators have made it clear that their negotiations with the United States will be 
based on the GPA – in fact, that the T-TIP agreement may set a benchmark for future changes 
to the GPA, which is rapidly becoming the central agreement in international efforts to 
promote free trade in procurement. In the process, the procurement provisions of NAFTA are 
proving less important, as cooperation in trade and procurement regulation centers on the 
much more broadly adopted GPA.  Whether through the T-TIP agreement (known as “TTIP” 
in Europe), or through the GPA, the international free trade agreements are likely to ease 
cross-border cooperation in framing procurement law. 
Part II of this chapter reviews NAFTA’s procurement-related provisions in detail, and 
discusses some of the protections built into that agreement. Part III describes the launch of the 
T-TIP negotiations between the European Union and the United States, and notes that those
negotiations – based not on NAFTA, but on the GPA – demonstrate that the GPA has become
an important instrument (more important than NAFTA) in framing free trade agreements in
procurement. Part III describes how the T-TIP agreement might be used to open greater
European access to public procurement markets in the United States, especially at the sub-
central (state) level. Part III also discusses one option to open that access – to require states,
when spending the billions of dollars of federal grants distributed every year, to afford
European vendors the same “national treatment” they afford U.S. vendors – and describes
some of the hurdles that face that approach.  Finally, Part III discusses how the T-TIP
agreement could be used to establish an ongoing mechanism -- specifically, an administrative
structure to coordinate European and U.S. federal procurement regulations -- for the
“transnationalization” of public procurement law.
II. Content and Application of NAFTA Chapter 10
Chapter 10 of NAFTA requires each NAFTA party (Mexico, Canada and the United States) to 
afford non-discriminatory, “national” treatment in the procurement of goods and services 
from suppliers from the other NAFTA countries. NAFTA also specifies certain procedural 
requirements for procurement, to ensure that procurements are carried out in a transparent, 
effective and fair manner.  
The U.S. Department of Commerce noted that, for Canada and the United States, NAFTA’s 
Chapter 10 “built on commitments already made in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement 
and the 1979 GATT Government Procurement Code.”5 In contrast, Chapter 10 was “Mexico’s 
first commitment to eliminate discriminatory government procurement practices with respect 
to foreign goods, services and suppliers.”6
4 For a discussion of the procurement-related elements of Canada’s Free-Trade Agreement with the 
European Union, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) see European Commission, Facts 
and Figures of the EU-Canada Free Trade Deal, EC MEMO/13/911 (18 October 2013), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-911_en.htm (last visited 26 February 2014).
5 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Trade Compliance Center, 
Chapter Ten (Government Procurement) of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), available at 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/Exporters_Guides/List_All_Guides/NAFTA_chapter10_guide.asp (last 
visited 26 February 2014). 
6 Ibid. 
3The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) prepared an explanatory Statement of 
Administrative Action for NAFTA, which was submitted to the U.S. Congress in compliance 
with section 1103 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, to accompany the 
implementing legislation for NAFTA.7 The statement noted: 
NAFTA was not an endpoint; the agreement established a framework for further trilateral, 
regional and multilateral cooperation.8
Although under NAFTA state, provincial and local governments in the three nations generally 
must conform to the same obligations as those applicable to the countries’ federal governments, 
with regard to procurement, NAFTA Chapter 10, which covers procurement, imposes no 
obligations on state, provincial or local governments.9
The USTR was to appoint a coordinator within his office to pursue further negotiations under 
NAFTA on state government procurement.10
The USTR Statement of Administrative Action also addressed NAFTA Chapter 10 (which 
relates to procurement) in more specific detail, as is discussed below. 
A. Non-Discrimination and National Treatment
NAFTA’s Chapter 10 generally required the three NAFTA countries to eliminate “buy 
national” restrictions on the majority of non-defense related purchases by their federal 
governments, on goods and services provided by firms in North America.11 For the United 
States and Canada, as noted, NAFTA’s Chapter 10 built on the measures to open procurement 
markets in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) Agreement on Government 
Procurement and the prior Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement.12 For Mexico, 
however, this was the first time that Mexico had eliminated discriminatory government 
procurement practices, and firms from outside North America – including European and 
Asian firms – would not benefit from Mexico’s commitments under NAFTA’s Chapter 10.13
Article 1003 to the agreement sets forth the requirements regarding national treatment and 
non-discrimination. Article 1003(1) requires that, with respect to measures covered by 
Chapter 10, each party is to afford suppliers of another party “treatment no less favorable than 
the most favorable treatment that the Party accords to its own goods and suppliers,” and to 
“goods and suppliers of another Party.” Nor, under Article 1003(2), is any party to treat a 
locally established supplier less favorably than other suppliers based on foreign affiliation or 
ownership.
Article 1001 makes it clear that no party to NAFTA may structure a procurement in order to 
avoid the obligations of the agreement. Article 1001 also states that, while procurements 
covered by the agreement could include procurement by such methods as purchase, lease or 
7 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act: Statement of Administrative Action, available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2647 (last visited 26 
February 2014). 
8 Ibid. 3. 
9 Ibid. 4. Annex 1001.1a-3 to NAFTA, State and Provincial Government Entities, notes that coverage 
“under this Annex will be the subject of consultations with state and provincial governments in accordance with 
Article 1024.” The text of the NAFTA agreement can be found at www.nafta-sec-alena.org. 
10 USTR Statement of Administrative Action (fn. 7) 10. 
11 Ibid. 135. 
12 Ibid. For a discussion of the differences between NAFTA and the prior GATT agreement see, e.g., C.
MUGGENBERG, The Government Procurement Chapter of NAFTA, 1 U.S.-Mex. L. J. 295 (1993). 
13 USTR Statement of Administrative Action (fn. 7) 135. 
4rental, covered procurements are not to include non-contractual agreements or any form of 
government assistance.
B. Offsets 
Article 1006 establishes a blanket ban against offsets, requiring that each party ensure that its 
entities do not seek or impose offsets. The agreement defines offsets to mean  
conditions imposed or considered by an entity prior to or in the course of its procurement process 
that encourage local development or improve its Party’s balance of payments accounts, by 
means of requirements of local content, licensing of technology, investment, counter-trade or 
similar requirements.
C. Covered Entities, Thresholds, Exceptions and Exclusions 
Chapter 10 of NAFTA gives firms from each of the three countries access to the government 
agencies and government-controlled enterprises, including important Mexican “parastatal” 
entities, listed in Annex 1001 to the agreement. Under these provisions, the Mexican 
government is to provide U.S. and Canadian suppliers with expanding access to PEMEX (the 
state-owned petroleum company) and CFE (the Mexican government’s electrical utilitity), 
though that access is subject to limited “set-asides” by PEMEX and CFE for Mexican 
suppliers.14
Under Chapter 10, the threshold for NAFTA coverage for purchases by covered entities in 
Canada and the United States is US$ 25,000 (this carried forward the threshold under the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement). For other purchases by covered federal agencies in the 
three countries, the threshold is US$ 50,000 for goods and services, and US$ 6.5 million for 
construction services. Finally, for those enterprises owned by a signatory federal government, 
the thresholds for coverage are US$ 250,000 for goods and services, and US$ 8 million for 
purchases of construction services.15 In determining whether these thresholds are met, the 
parties to NAFTA are to use the estimated value of procurements at the time of publication.16
Under Article 1018’s exceptions, the parties generally reserved the right of any party to take 
“any action […] which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests relating to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials, [or to] 
“procurement indispensable for national security or for national defense purposes.”  
Article 1018 also states that, provided such measures are not applied in a matter that could 
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between parties or a disguised restriction on 
trade, nothing in Chapter 10 is to be construed to prevent any party from maintaining 
measures “(a) necessary to protect public morals, order or safety; (b) necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; (c) necessary to protect intellectual property; or (d) 
relating to goods or services of handicapped persons, of philanthropic institutions or of prison 
labor.” 
Under NAFTA’s Chapter 10, the United States excluded certain types of procurement from 
coverage, including but not limited to the following: 
Set-asides on behalf of small and minority businesses.17
14 Ibid. 135. 
15 Ibid. 136. 
16 NAFTA, Article 1002(2). 
17 NAFTA, Annex 1001.2b, General Notes. 
5Procurement of transportation services that form a part of, or are incidental to, a procurement 
contract.18
Procurements by the U.S. Department of Defense of clothing and textiles covered by the “Berry 
Amendment,” and procurements of certain specialty metals.19
Procurements by the U.S. Department of Agriculture of agricultural goods in furtherance of 
agricultural support programs or human feeding programs.20
Mexico and Canada similarly excluded certain types of procurements from coverage, as is set 
forth, for example, in Annex 1001.1b-1 to the agreement.
D. Planning and Publication 
Chapter 10 of NAFTA says relatively little about procurement planning, but instead focuses 
on transparency regarding rules, opportunities and awards. Article 1019 sets forth general 
requirements regarding publication of laws, regulations and decisions regarding covered 
government procurement. With regard to specific procurements, Article 1010 sets forth 
standard best practices regarding prior publication. Article 1010 establishes special 
requirements for those times when procuring entities solicit for a qualification process,21 and 
when procuring entities use qualified supplier lists.22 Where a procuring entity seeks to amend 
a solicitation before bids or proposals are due, the entity must give notice of the amendment to 
all, using the original form of publication – not just to those that have expressed interest in the 
procurement. And, notably, any “significant information given […]to a supplier with respect 
to a particular procurement shall be given simultaneously to all other interested suppliers, 
[sufficiently in advance] so as to provide all suppliers concerned adequate time to consider the 
information and to respond.”23
This suggests a possible independent line of challenge, should one supplier, and not its 
competitors, gain special access to inside information with the procuring entity. 
Article 1013 explains the procedural steps that must be met in publicizing a prospective 
tender. Article 1013(b) specifically states that a procurement entity must “reply promptly to 
any reasonable request for relevant information made by a supplier participating in the 
tendering procedure, on condition that such information does not give that supplier an 
advantage over its competitors in the procedure for the award of the contract.” 
Article 1012 sets forth minimum times to allow, after solicitations are published, for the 
submission of tenders. For open tendering procedures, that minimum time is generally 40 
days. Notably, Article 1012 also addresses the time after award, before delivery, and says that 
when a procuring entity establishes a delivery date, the entity must, “consistent with its own 
reasonable needs, take into account such factors as the complexity of the procurement, the 
extent of subcontracting anticipated and the time realistically required for production, 
destocking and transport of goods from the points of supply.”24
Paragraph (8) of Article 1010 includes a requirement that a procuring entity must “indicate in 
the notices referred to in this Article that the procurement is covered by this Chapter.” At least 
in the U.S. federal system, this obligation is apparently not met. In U.S. practice, while 
18 Ibid. 
19 NAFTA, Annex 1001.1b-1. 
20 NAFTA, Annex 1001.1a-1, Schedule of the United States. 
21 NAFTA, Art. 1010(5). 
22 NAFTA, Art. 1010(6). 
23 NAFTA, Art. 1010(7). 
24 NAFTA, Art. 1012(4). 
6regulations require that federal solicitations conform to NAFTA,25 there is typically no 
reference to NAFTA in the published notices themselves.26
E. Contractor Qualification 
In furtherance of the non-discrimination requirements of Article 1003, contracting entities 
under NAFTA are not, in the qualification of suppliers, to discriminate between suppliers of 
other parties. While Article 1009 generally describes common best practices in vendor 
qualification, Article 1009 (2)(c) appears more probing. That provision requires that, in 
assessing vendor qualifications,  
“the financial, commercial and technical capacity of a supplier shall be judged both on the basis 
of that supplier’s global business activity, including its activity in the territory of the Party of 
the supplier, and its activity, if any, in the territory of the Party of the procuring entity.”  
This provision appears to mandate qualification assessments that reach far beyond the 
qualifying state – a stark contrast to many contractor performance assessments, which tend to 
focus only on the contractor’s local work. 
F. Specifications and Requirements 
Technical specifications were addressed by Article 1007, which required each party to ensure 
that its entities do not employ technical specifications “with the purpose or effect of creating 
unnecessary obstacles to trade.” Under Article 1007, each party is to ensure that any technical 
specification prescribed by its procuring entities is, where appropriate, (a) specified in terms 
of performance criteria rather than design or descriptive characteristics, and (b) based on 
international standards, national technical regulations, recognized national standards, or 
building codes. Technical specifications are, moreover, not to refer to trade names “unless 
there is no sufficiently precise […] way of otherwise describing the procurement 
requirements,” and provided that in such cases words such as “or equivalent” are included in 
the tender documentation, so that equivalent products may be offered. 
Article 1007(4) calls for parties to ensure that its entities do not seek or accept advice in the 
preparation of a solicitation from a person that may have a commercial interest in that 
procurement. These “organizational conflicts of interest” are more broadly prohibited under 
U.S. federal procurement law.27
G. Tendering, Competitions and Awards 
Under Article 1008, tendering procedures are to be non-discriminatory. Accordingly, each 
party is to ensure that its entities do not provide any suppliers with procurement information 
that would, in effect, preclude competition. Per Article 1008, procuring entities are supposed 
to afford any supplier equal access to information before the solicitation is issued. 
25 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 5.203(h), 48 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 5.203(h); 
FAR 25.408, 48 C.F.R. § 25.408.  The Federal Acquisition Regulation is updated regularly at 
www.acquisition.gov/far. 
26 While NAFTA Annex 1010.1 states that U.S. solicitations will be published in the Commerce 
Business Daily, in fact that publication was replaced by an online resource, Federal Business Opportunities, 
available at www.fbo.gov, some years ago. That website publishes all significant federal procurement 
opportunities; see FAR 5.201, 48 C.F.R. § 5.201. 
27 FAR Subpart 9.5, 48 C.F.R. Subpart 9.5. 
7Article 1011 describes “selective” tendering procedures. In the U.S. federal system, the 
procedural requirements here would, it seems, be most applicable to other than full and open 
competition, as contemplated by Part 6 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.28 Under those 
U.S. procedures, as with NAFTA Article 1011, procuring entities must seek the maximum 
practicable procurement.29
Although multilateral, contemporaneous competitive negotiations are very common in the 
U.S. federal procurement system – they are almost always used for complex weapon systems 
and information technology systems30 – NAFTA provides relatively little guidance on the use 
of competitive negotiations in procurement. Article 1014 does state, though, that when 
negotiations are used, offerors’ information must be held in confidence, and a procuring entity 
may not provide “to any person information intended to assist any supplier to bring its tender 
up to the level of any other tender.” To reduce the risk of discrimination, Article 1014 
requires that all vendors must be given notice of any modifications to the procuring entity’s 
requirements during negotiations, so that all may submit final, amended tenders in 
conformance with the changed requirements. 
The competition and award processes are governed by Article 1015, which allows for 
electronic submissions of tenders. Article 1015(4)(b) addresses abnormally low tenders, and 
says that if an “entity has received a tender that is abnormally lower in price than other 
tenders submitted, [then the entity] may inquire of the supplier to ensure that it can comply 
with the conditions of participation and is or will be capable of fulfilling the terms of the 
contract.”  
The Article does not, however, explain how that inquiry should be structured – which leaves 
open the possibility that a foreign, low-price offeror may face a very discriminatory, intrusive 
inquiry regarding its cost structure. 
Article 1015 also bars any covered entity from requiring that a supplier, to win award, have 
previously won a contract from that procuring entity, or that the supplier have had previous 
work experience within that party’s territory. In practice, however, award of mission-critical 
systems, such as information technology systems, often turns on demonstrated experience 
with the same or similar systems; these practices may, though, run afoul of Article 1015’s 
anti-discrimination protections, should vendors from other NAFTA nations complain that 
these experience requirements are, in practice, protectionist.  
Article 1015 further requires that procuring entities inform losing tenderers, upon request, of 
the basics of the award, and that the awarding entities give losing tenderers, again upon 
request, a debriefing on the bases for the award. Article 1015’s requirements are, in fact, 
much weaker than the notice and debriefing requirements under the U.S. Federal Acquisition 
Regulation. Thus, for example, while Article 1015(7) calls for publication of the award within 
72 days, the Federal Acquisition Regulation calls for immediate publication of awards over 
US$ 4 million.31
28 48 C.F.R. Part 6. 
29 Compare NAFTA, Art. 1011(3) (“[t]o ensure optimum effective competition between the suppliers of 
the Parties under selective tendering procedures, an entity shall, for each procurement, invite tenders from the 
maximum number of domestic suppliers and suppliers of the other Parties, consistent with the efficient operation 
of the procurement system.”) with FAR 6.301(d), 48 C.F.R. § 6.301(d) (“[w]hen not providing for full and open 
competition, the contracting officer shall solicit offers from as many potential sources as is practicable under the 
circumstances.”). NAFTA, Article 1016, Limited Tendering Procedures, lists additional, highly restricted 
circumstances in which limited tendering may be used. 
30 See, e.g., FAR Part 15, 48 C.F.R. Part 15. 
31 See, e.g., FAR 5.303 (“[c]ontracting officers shall make information available on awards over US$ 4 
million (unless another dollar amount is specified in agency acquisition regulations) in sufficient time for the 
agency concerned to announce it by 5 p.m. Washington, DC, time on the day of award.”). 
8H. Bid Challenges and Other Remedies 
NAFTA Chapter 10 includes, in Section C, Article 1017, extensive requirements regarding 
each nation’s bid challenge (or “protest”) system. The Statement of Administrative Action 
which was prepared by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative described this bid 
challenge system: 
Articles 1008 to 1016 set out a series of rules designed to ensure that procurement practices in 
all three countries are fair, transparent and predictable. The basic rule, established by Article 
1008, is that of non-discrimination in procurement procedures. The NAFTA also requires 
covered entities to follow procedures similar to those required under the GATT Code, with 
respect to qualification of suppliers, time limits, documentation, award of contracts and other 
aspects of the procurement process. The United States and Canada already adhere to these 
procedures. Mexico will be adopting them for the first time under the NAFTA. They will result 
in significant changes in the way Mexico conducts its procurements.  
* * * *  
In order to promote fair and open procurement procedures, Article 1017 requires each 
government to maintain a "bid challenge" mechanism enabling individual suppliers to have the 
entire bidding process reviewed. Suppliers from other NAFTA countries will have the right to 
challenge both bid procedures and contract awards, and will be assured that an independent 
body in each country will review such challenges and recommend action to correct any 
discrepancies.32
This excerpt from the Statement of Administrative Action highlighted two important issues.  
First, that the United States’ position was that NAFTA required procuring entities to follow 
procedures similar to those required under the GATT Code, and that the United States and 
Canada adhered to those requirements. Thus, as the Statement of Administrative Action 
emphasized elsewhere, NAFTA would require few, if any, regulatory changes for the United 
States.33
Second, the Statement of Administrative Action left open a question regarding the bid 
challenges contemplated by NAFTA: Would vendors be able to protest violations of 
NAFTA’s anti-discrimination provisions, or would vendors simply protest violations of the 
regulations which reflected NAFTA’s obligations – meaning, in effect, that NAFTA could not 
be directly enforced by vendors?34 The USTR Statement of Administrative Action, and the 
text of Section C of NAFTA itself, suggested the latter – that vendors would challenge the 
implementing regulations, and that those challenges would merely highlight discrepancies 
between NAFTA’s requirements and the regulatory scheme.35 This question has not been 
squarely resolved in the two bid challenge forums in the U.S. federal system, the U.S. Court 
32 USTR Statement of Administrative Action (n 7) 137-38.  
33 See, e.g., ibid. 1. 
34 Cf. 19 U.S.C. § 3312c(c) (“[n]o person other than the United States […] shall have any cause of action 
or defense under […] the Agreement [NAFTA] or by virtue of Congressional approval thereof; or […] may 
challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction by any department, agency, 
or other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision of a State on the ground that 
such action or inaction is inconsistent with the Agreement […]”). 
35 See, e.g., NAFTA, Art. 1017(1)(m) (“each Party should authorize its reviewing authority, following 
the conclusion of a bid challenge procedure, to make additional recommendations in writing to an entity 
respecting any facet of the entity’s procurement process that is identified as problematic during the investigation 
of the challenge, including recommendations for changes in the procurement procedures of the entity to bring 
them into conformity with this Chapter […]”). 
9of Federal Claims and the Government Accountability Office, or in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit (which hears appeals from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims).36
Guidance issued by the Public Works and Government Services Canada, a leading centralized 
procuring agency in the Canadian federal government, indicates, in contrast, that Canadian 
regulators have concluded that vendors may, in fact, bring direct challenges to Canadian 
government violations of NAFTA. The PWGSC Supply Manual states, in relevant part: 
1.35.1. Canadian International Trade Tribunal 
a) The international trade agreements require that each party have an independent bid challenge 
authority. The Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT)37 is the bid challenge authority for 
Canada for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), World Trade Organization 
Agreement on Government Procurement (WTO-AGP) Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement 
(CCFTA), Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement (CPFTA) and Agreement on Internal Trade 
(AIT). A potential supplier may file a complaint concerning a procurement action to the CITT, 
on the grounds that any aspect of the procurement process relating to a requirement covered by 
these agreements is unfair or discriminatory. 
b) CITT is authorized to receive complaints pertaining to any aspect of the procurement process 
up to and including contract award, and also to conduct inquiries and make determinations. In 
dealing with a complaint, CITT must determine whether the government institution responsible 
for the procurement under review has complied with the requirements of the trade agreements 
and such other procedural requirements, as prescribed in the Canadian International Trade 
Tribunal Procurement Inquiry Regulations.38
The discussion above relates to direct challenges by vendors. There remains, however, the 
possibility of a formal dispute between the NAFTA parties. Under NAFTA Article 1022(5), 
where member nations perceive serious issues in other nations’ implementation of NAFTA 
Chapter 10, the affected party may have recourse to the inter-party dispute settlement 
procedures under Chapter 20 of NAFTA. 
36 Guidance issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce (fn. 5) suggests that vendors could bring a 
direct challenge, in the U.S. forums, to U.S. agency violations of NAFTA: “[t]o promote fair and open 
procurement, each Party is required to maintain ‘bid challenge’ mechanism. Suppliers have the right to challenge 
both bidding procedures and contract awards, and are assured that an independent body in each NAFTA country 
will review such challenges and recommend action to correct any discrepancies. The NAFTA does not specify 
how the review should be conducted or what role interested parties should have. If the reviewing authority finds 
that there has been a violation under the NAFTA, it can issue a ‘recommendation’ that the procuring agency 
should re-evaluate the bids, allow suppliers to re-compete or even terminate contracts. According to Article 
1017, the procuring agency ‘shall normally follow the recommendations of the reviewing authority’, but it is not 
required to do so.” It is not clear, however, whether this guidance should be taken as an authoritative statement 
of U.S. government policy. 
37 The Canadian International Trade Tribunal “is the main quasi-judicial institution in Canada’s trade 
remedy system and has authority to […] inquire into complaints by potential suppliers concerning procurement 
by the federal government that is covered by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP), the Canada-
Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA), the Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement (CPFTA) and the CCOFTA”; 
see Canadian Court of International Trade, Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ending 31 March 2012 Chapter II, 
available at http://www.citt-tcce.gc.ca/publicat/ar2m_e.asp#P635_20993 (last visited 26 February 2014). 
38 Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), Supply Manual, § 1.35.1, available at 
https://buyandsell.gc.ca/policy-and-guidelines/supply-manual/section/1/35/1 (last visited 26 February 2014). 
Accord Canadian International Trade Tribunal, Procurement Review Process: A Descriptive Guide (2009) 
(“[t]he Tribunal’s mandate authorizes it to receive complaints pertaining to any aspect of the procurement 
process, conduct inquiries and make determinations. Its jurisdiction covers complaints under NAFTA, the AIT, 
the AGP and the CCFTA. […]In dealing with a complaint, the Tribunal must determine whether the government 
institution responsible for the procurement under review has complied with the requirements of NAFTA, the 
AIT, the AGP or the CCFTA and such other procedural requirements, as prescribed in the Regulations”), 
available at http://www.citt.gc.ca/publicat/guide_e.asp#P18_3222 (last visited 26 February 2014).  
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III.  A Competing Paradigm:  The U.S.-European Transatlantic Trade & 
Investment Partnership (T-TIP)39
According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, NAFTA created the world’s largest 
free trade area, which now links 450 million people producing US$ 17 trillion worth of goods 
and services.40  In 2013, however, European and U.S. policymakers launched formal talks on a 
United States-European free trade agreement, to cover a trading area with a bilateral trade 
volume of over US$ 900 billion annually.41 With regard to procurement provisions, the U.S. 
and European negotiators are building the new agreement – the Transatlantic Trade & 
Investment Partnership (T-TIP) – upon the text of the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement (which underwent a substantial reform finalized in 2012)42 rather than upon 
NAFTA’s Chapter 10. The revamped GPA reflects updated best practices, and touches on far 
more areas of important procurement policy; it was and is, therefore, a much more promising 
point of departure for the broader U.S.-EU Free Trade Agreement. 
A. Potential Economic Benefits of a T-TIP Agreement 
The T-TIP agreement presents potential economic gains for both the United States and the 
EU. In an independent study published in March 2013, the Center for Economic Policy 
Research (CEPR) found that an aggressive T-TIP agreement43 could increase the GDP of the 
EU and United States by up to 0.5% and 0.4% respectively.44 This could translate into gains of 
€ 119 billion in the European Union and US$ 121 billion in the United States.45 Because the 
39 The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of R. Locke Bell, student at the George 
Washington University Law School, in preparing portions of this part of the paper; additional material from this 
part was presented by the author, in expanded form, at the Thomson Reuters Government Contracts Year in 
Review conference in February 2014, in Washington, D.C., in a paper entitled The European Procurement 
Directives and the Transatlantica Trade & Investment Partnership (T-TIP): Advancing U.S. – European Trade 
and Cooperation in Procurement (2014), to be made available on www.ssrn.com, and in an article co-authored 
with Hans-Joachim Priess, Breaking the Impasse in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
Negotiations: Rethinking Priorities in Procurement, 56 The Government Contractor ¶ 235 (Thomson Reuters 
July 23, 2014). .   
40 Available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-
agreement-nafta (last visited 26 February 2014).  
41 See, e.g., J. EWING, Trade Deal Between U.S. and Europe May Come to the Forefront, New York 
Times (25 November 2012); European Parliament Press Release: Free Trade with US But Not at Any Price, Say 
MEPs (23 October 2012) (“[w]e want to send a strong political signal in favour of opening negotiations with the 
United States in order to create a real transatlantic market with enormous opportunities for growth. Agreement is 
not going to be easy and there are very divergent interests between the US and Europe […]. [Members of the 
European Parliament] call in the non-binding resolution for negotiations to begin in the first half of 2013, 
pointing out that that the EU and US have the ‘largest economic relationship in the world’ with a trade volume of 
€ 700 billion and bilateral investment valued at almost € 2.4 trillion in 2011. Gross domestic product (GDP) in 
the EU and US could be boosted by € 163 billion by 2018 if half the non-tariff barriers were removed, they 
stress”). 
42 See WTO, Committee on Government Procurement, Doc. GPA/113 (2 April 2012).  
43 See Centre for Economic Policy Research, Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: 
An Economic Assessment 34 (Final Project Report, March 2013), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf (last visited 26 February 2014). In the 
model used by the Center, an aggressive T-TIP agreement would be one which eliminated all tariffs, 25 percent 
of non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) on goods and services, and 50 per cent of procurement-related NTBs. The 
less ambitious T-TIP analysis assumed that the agreement could eliminate 98 per cent of all tariffs, 10 percent of 
NTBs on goods and services, and 25 percent of procurement-related NTBs; this less-ambitious version of the T-
TIP agreement would produce smaller overall economic benefits.  
44 Ibid. 46, Table 16. 
45 Ibid. 47, Table 17 (conversion rate of € 1= US$ 1.28). 
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two parties already enjoy very low tariff rates, any T-TIP agreement must focus on non-tariff 
barriers to trade (NTBs) in order to make a significant impact.46  Under the model described in 
the macroeconomic study by the CEPR (and sponsored by the European Union), procurement 
reform alone could increase GDP up to € 12 billion in the European Union and up to US$ 8.6 
billion in the United States.47 In this procurement-only scenario, the primary growth in trade 
would be seen in goods such as chemicals and motor vehicle for the European Union, and in 
chemicals and fabricated metals for the United States.48
Procurement-related non-tariff barriers to trade pose major hindrances to trade in many fields; 
expert opinion and private sector surveys have shown procurement-related non-tariff barriers 
to be the leading NTBs affecting construction services, and the second-ranked NTBs affecting 
iron, steel and metal products.49 Studies have suggested that the main procurement-related 
NTBs facing firms in transatlantic trade are provisions favoring local firms (such as export 
controls in the United States, and the various “Buy American” preferences), discrimination 
against foreign entities, and a lack of transparency.50 Major barriers to European access to 
procurement opportunities in the United States are the Berry Amendment, the Buy American 
Act (which covers supplies generally), and the Buy America Act (which applies to certain 
transportation infrastructure purchases).51 The Small Business Act’s preferences for small 
businesses and small-business set-asides also pose an indirect impediment to European firms 
seeking to win U.S. contracts.52 Restrictions on U.S. access to European procurement stem 
from a number of factors, including favoritism of EU firms, delays in the finalization of 
contracts, and documentation issuance and reciprocity requirements in architectural and 
construction services.53 Due to the administrative nature of the EU barriers, in comparison to 
the legal restrictions to access in the United States, it is hoped that the U.S. barriers will be 
more “actionable”, or addressable through a T-TIP agreement (this issue is addressed further 
below).54 It is also expected that the European Union will realize a greater macroeconomic 
benefit, but after a slight downturn in the short run, the United States will begin to realize 
long-term macroeconomic gains as well.55
The European negotiators hope to overcome a deeply embedded set of domestic preferences 
in U.S. procurements – including, for example, the “Buy American” preference which was a 
prominent part of the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009. The U.S. government 
has been reluctant to abandon these measures, and has included extensive reservations to free 
trade obligations under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and bilateral 
free trade agreements.56 The European Commission estimated that “only 32% (€ 178bn) of the 
U.S. procurement market is open to EU businesses under the commitments recently taken by 
46 Ibid. 7. 
47 Ibid. Note this is with a 50 per cent reduction in procurement-related NTBs. 
48 Ibid. 37, Tables 10 and 11. 
49 Ecorys, Non-Tariff Measures in EU-US Trade and Investment – An Economic Analysis, 166, Table 
20.3, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/december/tradoc_145613.pdf (last visited 26 
February 2014). 
50 Ibid. xxv. 
51 Ibid. xxxiv. The provisions at 41 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)-(d) are known as the Buy American Act, and they 
apply to all purchases of goods over the micropurchase threshold. 49 U.S.C. § 5323 is known as the Buy 
America Act and applies to transit-related grants to states and local organizations.  
52 Ibid. 186-87.  
53 Ibid. 38, 187. 
54 Ibid. 187; European Commission CEPR Report (fn. 43 27. 
55 See Ecorys (fn. 49 Table 20.4.  
56 European Commission, Impact Assessment Report on the Future of EU-US Trade Relations 13 (12 
March 2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150759.pdf (last visited 26 
February 2014). 
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the US in the framework of the GPA.”57 In finalizing their impact assessment, the European 
Commission recommended:  
Finally, in respect of public procurement, we should aim at improving EU firms’ access to 
public procurement opportunities in the US, inter alia by setting the following operational 
objectives:  
1) increasing the coverage of federal procurement (e.g. additional procuring entities and 
removing Buy America conditions attached to federal funding);  
2) broadening the coverage of the US sub-federal level both by increasing the number of states, 
as well as the coverage of those currently offered by the GPA;  
3) persuading the US to progressively eliminate trade barriers to cross-border procurement 
(“Buy America(n)” provisions, sectoral derogations, in particular on mass-transit and with 
respect to SMEs).58
B. Launch of the T-TIP Negotiations 
In his State of the Union Address on 12 February 2013, President Barack Obama announced 
his administration’s intent to enter into negotiations with the European Union (EU) to create 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.59 A month later, the European Union 
called on each of its member states to prepare for negotiations on this “game-changing trade 
deal”,60 and shortly thereafter, on 20 March 2013, the White House sent a memorandum to the 
House of Representatives detailing plans to initiate T-TIP talks within 90 days.61
The decision to pursue a free trade agreement with the European Union came at the 
recommendation of the U.S.-EU High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth launched by 
President Obama and EU leaders in November 2011.62 In its final report of 11 February 2013, 
the High Level Working Group urged policymakers to “initiate as soon as possible the formal 
domestic procedures necessary to launch negotiations on a comprehensive trade and 
investment agreement.”63
The Group suggested a flexible agreement “designed to evolve over time” and geared toward 
producing substantial improvement in the areas of market access, regulatory issues and non-
tariff barriers to trade.64 With regard to procurement, the HLWG “recommend[ed] that the 
goal of negotiations […] be to enhance business opportunities through substantially improved 
access to government procurement opportunities at all levels of government on the basis of 
national treatment.”65
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid. 23. 
59 Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, Daily Comp. Press Doc. 90 (23 
February 2013). 
60 European Commission, European Commission Fires Starting Gun for EU-US Trade Talks (12 March 
2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=877 (last visited 14 February 2014). 
61 Letter from Ambassador Demetrios Marantis, Acting United States Trade Representative, to the 
Honorable John Boehner, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives (20 March 2013), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/03202013%20TTIP%20Notification%20Letter.PDF (last visited 26 
February 2014). 
62 Ibid. 
63 High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, Final Report (11 February 2013), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/02132013%20FINAL%20HLWG%20REPORT.pdf (last visited 26 
February 2014). 
64 Ibid. 2. 
65 Ibid. 3.  
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Throughout their report, the members of the High Level Working Group urged that the T-TIP 
negotiations be focused on increased transparency, regulatory harmonization and open 
access.66
Canada and Mexico have reportedly shown interest in joining the T-TIP,67 and there are 
reports that the United States has suggested that Turkey be included in the agreement.68
The EU-U.S. agreement may be shaped by a prior trade agreement between Canada and the 
European Union, the Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement (CETA), the key 
elements of which were announced in October 2013.69 The CETA agreement would (among 
other things) substantially open procurement markets, by opening all Canadian sub-central 
(including provincial and municipal) levels of government procurement to European vendors. 
Furthermore, Canada would, under the agreement, create a single electronic procurement 
website that would combine information on opportunities at all levels of government, to make 
it easier for European firms to compete.70 European officials and others have noted that the 
Canadian agreement may serve as a template for the T-TIP agreement.
C. Importance of Procurement to the T-TIP Negotiations 
As the T-TIP negotiations have unfolded, it has become clear that procurement is politically 
very important for the European negotiating team. The European Union would like to be able 
to point to negotiating success in procurement, to mollify European stakeholders who fear that 
a T-TIP agreement could grant U.S. exporters much broader access to other sectors in Europe, 
such as agriculture.  
In addressing procurement, the European Union’s key goal is gaining better access to “sub-
central” markets in the United States, especially state procurement markets.71 While 
integration of the European procurement markets under the EU directives and the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) has, in effect, given U.S. exporters generally 
free access to sub-central procurement markets in the European Union, only 37 of the U.S. 
66 Ibid. 
67 G. MOODY, Mexico Will Ask to Join US-EU Transatlantic Trade Agreement, Techdirt (blog) (14 
March 2013), available at https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130313/10181122311/mexico-will-ask-to-join-us-
eu-transatlantic-trade-agreement.shtml; D. GABRIEL, Economic Integration: Towards a North America-EU 
Transatlantic Free Trade Zone, Global Research (26 March 2013), available at 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/economic-integration-towards-a-north-america-eu-transatlantic-free-trade-
zone/5328543 (last visited 26 February 2014); J. Vey, R. EMMOTT & I. Melander, France Threatens to Delay 
Quick Start of EU-U.S. Trade Talks, Reuters (25 March 2013); Z. LAIDI, French Commentary Warns 
Transatlantic Trade Agreement Likely to Be to Europe’s Detriment, World News Connection (19 March 2013). 
68 G. MOODY, Now US Wants Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement with European Union to Include 
Turkey: Who’s Next?, Techdirt (19 March 2013). 
69 See European Commission, Trade: Canada (19 November 2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/canada/ (last visited 26 February 2014); see, e.g., 
Government of Canada, Agreement Overview: The Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement 3 (2013), available at http://www.actionplan.gc.ca/en/page/ceta-aecg/agreement-overview (last 
visited 26 February 2014). 
70 See European Commission, Trade: News Archive: Facts and Figures of the EU-Canada Free Trade 
Deal (18 October 2013), available at trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=974 (last visited 26 February 
2014).   
71 See, e.g., European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Note for the Attention of the Trade 
Policy Committee of the Council of the European Union re: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), Doc. 238/13 (21 June 2012), Attachment: EU-US FTA Negotiations, Non Paper on Public Procurement 
2 (20 June 2012), available at http://www.iatp.org/files/TPC-TTIP-non-Papers-for-1st-Round-Negotiatons-
June20-2013.pdf (last visited 26 February 2014).   
14
states have agreed to open their markets under the GPA (typically only partially),72 and almost 
no U.S. cities or other local governments have joined the free trade agreement.73
The U.S. government has long argued that principles of federalism bar the federal government 
from compelling the states to open their procurement markets under an international 
agreement, such as the GPA.74 Rather than challenging that position, some in the European 
procurement community have suggested that Europeans could instead gain access to state 
procurement markets indirectly, through the federal government’s grantmaking authority, as 
the federal government makes hundreds of billions of dollars of grants to state and local 
governments every year.75 These Europeans argue that the United States could use grants to 
liberalize state procurement markets, by requiring that state grantees afford “national 
treatment” to vendors from Europe.  
D. Federal Guidance on Grants and Its Impact on T-TIP Negotiations 
In the T-TIP negotiations, were the United States to accede to European demands that state 
grantees not discriminate against European vendors, the U.S. commitment might ultimately be 
included in grants guidance – though, as is discussed below, the grants guidance might need 
to be amended to bar federal, state and local procurement preferences.  
The U.S. government’s grants guidance was recently overhauled. On 26 December 2013, the 
U.S. Office of Management & Budget (OMB), a part of the Executive Office of the President, 
issued final guidance combining the various circulars and guidance which had long governed 
federal grants to states, local governments and other grantees.76 The U.S. government makes 
grants of hundreds of billions of dollars to state and local governments; in fiscal year 2010, 
for example, those grants totaled over US$ 500 billion.77
Before the revised grants guidance was issued, for over 20 years, the common rule which 
governed federal grants had generally barred grantees from discriminating based on state or 
local procurement preferences.78 Although the common rule was changed in the last days of 
2013, when OMB published the revamped guidance,79 the revised guidance again set limited 
72 See, e.g., WTO, Doc. No. GPA/113 417-26 (2012) (text of revised GPA, awaiting ratification, lists 
states that have agreed to join GPA), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm 
(last visited 26 February 2014).   As noted (fn. 2), the revised GPA took effect on April 6, 2014. 
73 Ibid. 428 (handful of U.S. local authorities included in GPA). 
74 See generally A., Note & Comment: Federalism and International Trade: The Intersection of the 
World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement [Agreement] and State “Buy Local” Legislation, 4 
B.Y.U. Int’l. & Mgt. Rev. 179 (2008).   
75 See, e.g., European Commission (fn. 71 3. 
76 78 Fed. Reg. 78, 590 (26 December 2013).  The consolidated guidance is referred to informally as the 
“Super Circular” or the “Omni Circular.”
77 U.S. Census Bureau, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0431.pdf 
(last visited 26 February 2014). 
78 See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 8034, 8097 (1988) (text of common grants management rule: “[g]rantees and 
subgrantees will conduct procurements in a manner that prohibits the use of statutorily or administratively 
imposed in-State or local geographical preferences in the evaluation of bids or proposals, except in those cases 
where applicable Federal statutes expressly mandate or encourage geographic preference.”); ibid. 8039 (“[t]he 
application of unreasonably restrictive qualifications and any percentage factors that give bidding advantages to 
in-State or local firms are barriers to open and free competition which are not in the public interest. Section 
__.36(c)(2) [the non-discrimination requirement of the grants common rule] was included in the proposed 
regulation to foster competition, fairness, and economy in the award of contracts”);. see generally D. J.
CANTELME, Federal Grant Programs to State and Local Governments, 25 Pub. Cont. L.J. 335 (1996).  
79 78 Fed. Reg. 78, 590 (26 December 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-
26/pdf/2013-30465.pdf (last visited 26 February 2014).  
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procurement standards;80 as before, section 200.319 of the new guidance (the procurement 
standard which bars state and local procurement preferences) does not apply to states.81
But even if the revamped grants guidance did bar state grantees from discriminating based on 
state preferences, a simple commitment not to discriminate might not be enough. Experience 
has shown that free trade agreements in procurement must also address non-tariff barriers to 
trade; in other words, it is not enough to treat foreign vendors without discrimination, if there 
are other procurement rules or processes (non-tariff barriers to trade) which in practice 
impede those foreign vendors. To address this second layer of trade barriers, the Europeans 
may insist that the U.S. government also require state (and presumably other) grantees to 
follow certain minimum procedural standards in procurement.  
Notably, there is precedent for requiring federal grantees to follow certain procurement 
minimum standards, when the grantees procure using federal funds. OMB Circular A-110,82
recently incorporated into the revamped grants guidance, previously required that universities 
and other non-profit grantees use procurement systems which met certain minimum standards, 
and historically OMB Circular A-102 (which applied to state and local government grantees) 
also imposed minimum requirements for procurement.83
As recently revised, however, the OMB grants guidance does not impose general procurement 
requirements on state grantees – the revised guidance, unlike past OMB guidance, does not 
describe in detail how grantees’ procurement processes should be shaped.  Per the discussion 
above, while the revised grants guidance issued on 26 December 2013 does include certain 
narrow procurement requirements, apparently for the most part those standards do not apply 
to state grantees.84 Thus, if the procurement standards under federal grants are to apply to the 
states – if the United States is to address European concerns about trade barriers by imposing 
uniform procurement standards on state grantees when they procure using federal dollars – the 
revised grants guidance will have to be rewritten to extend the procurement standards 
(including, presumably, the bar against state and local preferences discussed above) to state 
grantees. 
E. T-TIP Agreement: Long-Term Regulatory Cooperation in Procurement? 
The discussion above focused on how the United States might accommodate Europeans’ 
demand that European exporters be given the same access to sub-central procurement markets 
which U.S. exporters enjoy in Europe. A separate issue, however, is whether the United States 
and the European Union might erect a long-term structure for coordinating procurement rules, 
to facilitate transatlantic trade in the procurement markets. 
While those involved have argued for using the T-TIP agreement to establish a long-term 
mechanism for cooperating on laws and regulations that may raise non-tariff barriers to 
trade,85 procurement regulation has generally not been part of that discussion. The European 
80 78 Fed. Reg. 78, 631-334 (§§ 200.317-326).
81 See ibid. 631 (§ 200.317) (“[w]hen procuring property and services under a Federal award, a state 
must follow the same policies and procedures it uses for procurements from its non-Federal funds. The state will 
comply with § 200.322 Procurement of recovered materials and ensure that every purchase order or other 
contract includes any clauses required by section § 200.326 Contract provisions. All other non-Federal entities, 
including subrecipients of a state, will follow §§ 200.318 General procurement standards through 200.326 
Contract provisions”).  
82 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a110 (last visited 26 February 2014). 
83 See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 45, 889-91 (12 September 1977) (Attachment O to Circular A-102, 
Procurement Standards).  
84 See § 200.317, 78 Fed. Reg. 78, 631.
85 Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151622.pdf (last visited 26 
February 2014). 
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negotiators have instead indicated that the T-TIP agreement would be used to frame future 
cooperation in other spheres of regulation, aside from procurement.86 Procurement need not, 
however, be left behind.  Coordination on procurement matters would be relatively easy, and 
with better cooperation between the two procurement regimes, both bodies of regulation (U.S. 
and European) could be improved and harmonized, thus reducing transaction costs for market 
participants and materially enhancing competition on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The benefits of using the T-TIP agreement to foster regulatory cooperation in procurement 
could carry far beyond the European Union and the United States, moreover.  Because the two 
systems stand as the most advanced procurement regimes, a process which identified best 
practices between the two systems would be a powerful tool for shaping procurement laws in 
other nations.  Regulatory cooperation under T-TIP could, in other words, do far more than 
strengthen procurement markets between Europe and the United States -- it could help forge a 
flexible, harmonized body of procurement law that could help shape the law in other 
jurisdictions, creating a truly “transnational” body of procurement law. 
IV. Conclusion 
While NAFTA was intended to create a free trade area between Canada, United States and 
Mexico, in fact the procurement-related provisions under NAFTA Chapter 10 were relatively 
limited.  The T-TIP agreement between the United States and European, currently under 
negotiation, may well prove a much stronger instrument in opening procurement markets, 
especially sub-central markets in the United States. This is in part because the T-TIP 
agreement will likely build on the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), 
which is emerging as the center point for international free trade agreements in procurement. 
There are, however, significant obstacles that must be overcome if the European Union and 
the United States are to make those gains in opening their respective procurement markets. At 
the same time, it is also possible that the T-TIP agreement will address a different class of 
barriers to trade – barriers based on regulatory disjunctures between the U.S. and European 
procurement regimes – by creating durable channels for cooperation, between Brussels and 
Washington, in harmonization of procurement rules.  By fostering transnational cooperation, 
the T-TIP agreement would take a step beyond the GPA, and indeed two steps beyond 
NAFTA:  more than just opening markets, and more than just eliminating procurement rules 
that impede international competition, T-TIP could open the door to a far more harmonized 
set of procurement rules internationally. 
86 See, e.g., European Commission, EU-US Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership: Trade 
Cross-Cutting Disciplines and Institutional Provisions – Initial EU Position Paper (2013), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151622.pdf (last visited 26 February 2014).
